In this atmosphere of economic, social, and political anxiety, certain ideas and terms seem to take hold very quickly. In politics, there are catchphrase we hear over and over again — “end of the day,” “double down,” “game-changer” — that are meant to push the listener into a conclusion that the facts don’t necessarily prove. “At the end of the day, this election is about …”; you get the idea.
One catchphrase rolling around concerns the idea of
General Motors and Chrysler merging. They want to consolidate for several good reasons, but one bad reason is so that they can combine their joint interests in the GMAC credit organization into a bank holding company that will qualify
for support from the U.S. Treasury’s bailout program. The rhetorical justification for this incredibly complex proposal is that a combination of GM and Chrysler would be “too big to fail.”
Just a month ago, General Motors alone (as well as Chrysler alone, and that other automaker, too, which I’m leaving out of this so as not to insult by association) was too big to fail — which was one reason the federal government was persuaded to
extend loan guarantees that would help them catch up with their global competitors in alternative-fuel technology.
Now, the proposition is that without some move to consolidate their businesses, because of poor sales and weak credit, GM and Chrysler will run out of cash within the next year or so. I’m not an economist or a financial expert, so I won’t contest that point. I trust GM and Chrysler to know where they stand, financially.
I’m challenging this idea that such a combination would be “too big to fail.” It sounds persuasive, but it’s just words.
A few weeks ago I
offered that bankruptcy would be the best route to recovery in the automotive industry, and I still believe it. A lot of people
(correctly) point out that bankruptcy would punish Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers, as well as lots of
communities and some states.
That may be true, though I think it’s probably overstated. Keep in mind that the only way for automakers to succeed is to keep investors
and car buyers enthusiastically involved with their enterprise. If GM and/or Chrysler is not engaging these markets, some other automaker will do it.
The thing that bankruptcy would do is speed the restructuring of GM (and/or Chrysler) into an enterprise that will engage the market once again. Bankruptcy would revalue assets — which cannot happen amid the current chaos. It would attract new capital. It would identify viable projects and eliminate superfluous activities. It would clarify future obligations, eliminating what’s unnecessary, unfeasible, or impossible.
The reason bankruptcy is a better route to recovery is that the problems for GM and Chrysler are not simply their past mistakes but, much more serious, their future liabilities. A merger would take the best of what’s currently available, but it would still have to address future obligations: wages, pensions, franchise commitments, and many others, not to mention their technological and manufacturing issues.
Bankruptcy would not come without
cost or impact, but a merger would have to bring the new organization to many of those same conclusions, and would do so less efficiently. And the outcry over those cuts would be worse, because at that point they will have ripped through more federal money. The government may be willing, but it’s unable to fix this problem.
The market will fix it. Not the financial market that’s trying cut its losses by concocting this “too big” merger. The consumer market will restore this industry: the market of savvy investors seeking a great deal, of creative designers and engineers proposing solutions, of clever managers offering new approaches, and of optimistic car buyers looking for something new.