The  coverage of General Motors and Chrysler Corp. in the past six months has been overwhelming, but it has not been too deep.

The justification for federal aid to rescue these organizations from defaulting has been that they are critical to the manufacturing supply chain (and to particular states and localities). Both are true, but rescuing the two OEMs is not having much of a pass-along effect for their suppliers.

And, as the story continues, there are likely to be further complications. Not only have many GM and Chrysler suppliers not been paid in the past year or so, bankruptcy now creates a basis for defaulting on debts entirely.

Still to come will be the fundamental adjustments to material supplies, like foundry-grade scrap. If it is not already clear, the entire supply chain is going to have to be reconceived.

Details like this are the substance of the argument that GM and Chrysler are too big to fail. And yet, it's plain that the impact on the automotive supply chain will be just as dire in spite of the "rescue." The rhetorical position that the OEMs need to be supported in order to support all the rest is now invalid.

Even so, we should continue to ask: who has been helped by the bailouts of GM and Chrysler?